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CoNFLICT OF LA.ws--DUB PRoCEss AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-DIRECT 
AcnoN STATUTE-Defendant issued a liability insurance policy to the manu-
facturer of a hair-waving product, an Illinois subsidiary of a Delaware corpora-
tion having its headquarters in Massachusetts. The policy, issued in Massa-
chusetts and delivered in Massachusetts and Illinois, was to protect the insured 
against damages that might be suffered by users of the product anywhere in 
the United States or Canada. It contained a "no action" clause enforceable 
under Massachusetts and lliinois law prohibiting direct actions against the in-
surer until final determination of the insured's liability, either by judgment or 
agreement. Alleging injuries sustained in Louisiana where the product was 
bought and used, plaintiff sued the insurer under the Louisiana direct action 
statute which was applicable even though an insurance contract was made in 
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another state and contained a clause forbidding such direct actions.1 Another 
provision, complied with by the defendant, compels foreign insurance compa-
nies to consent to such direct suits in order to do business in the state.2 The 
district court, affirmed by the court of appeals, dismissed the action, holding the 
statutes repugnant to the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. On 
appeal, held, reversed. Louisiana could apply its own law rather than that of 
Massachusetts or Illinois. The interests of the states where the insurance con-
tract was negotiated and delivered cannot outweigh the contacts and interests 
of Louisiana in taking care of persons injured in Louisiana; hence the due 
process and full faith and credit clauses of the Constitution do not compel 
Louisiana to subordinate its policy interests in a direct action to other state's 
contract rules. Justice Frankfurter concurred on the ground that Louisiana had 
validly exacted consent from the defendant to such direct actions as a condition 
of doing business within the state. Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance 
Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 75 S.Ct. 166 (1954). 
In order to overcome the hardships of the general rule denying an injured 
party a right of action against the tortfeasor's insurer in the absence of a con-
tractual provision to the contrary,3 numerous states have enacted statutes per-
mitting the injured party to sue the insurer directly. Although most direct action 
statutes are narrow in scope, 4 the modem trend is typified by the Louisiana 
statute which permits an immediate direct action by all injured parties no 
matter where the policy of insurance was issued.5 In applying a direct action 
statute, the courts reach different results depending on the jurisdiction's choice 
of the applicable conflict of laws rule.6 Although not all courts are in accord, a 
characterization of a direct action statute by the forum as procedural will auto-
1 La. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1950) tit. 22, §22.655 .. 
2 Id., §22.983. 
3 Chamberlin v. Los Angeles, 92 Cal. App. (2d) 330, 206 P. (2d) 661 (1949); 
Arnold v. Walton, 205 Ga. 606, 54 S.E. (2d) 424 (1949). 
4 Such statutes provide that the bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured will not 
release the insurer from liability and that after an unsatisfied judgment against the insured, 
the insurer may be sued directly. E.g., Cal. Ins. Code Ann. (Deering, Supp. 1953) §11580; 
Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §516.1; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 175, §§112, 113; Mich. 
Comp. Laws (1948) §522.33; 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §l67(1)(a), (b); 
R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 155, §1. 
5 La. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1950) tit. 22, §22.655. Likewise, Wis. Stat. (1953) §§85.93, 
260.11, permits direct actions by an injured party against an automobile liability insurer. 
However, Wisconsin courts have limited the impact of the statutes by refusing to invalidate 
no-action clauses when valid in the state where issued and delivered. Byerly v. Thorpe, 221 
Wis. 28, 265 N.W. 76 (1936); Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 25.6 Wis. 507, 41 N.W. (2d) 611 
(1950). On the modern trend of the law, see Lassiter, "Direct Actions Against the In-
surer," 1949 INs. L.J. 411; Leigh, ''Direct Actions Against Liability Insurers," 1949 INs. 
L.J. 633. 
6 For a detailed analysis of the fundamental choice of law problems of direct action 
statutes, see 3 UTAH L. R.Ev. 490 (1953); 39 VA. L. R.Ev. 655 (1953). 
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matically cause the forum to apply its own law allowing7 or disallowing8 the 
direct action. The situation is otherwise when the statute is interpreted to be 
substantive as the forum may then apply foreign law by contract or tort rules 
of conflict of laws. A few cases have followed a tort choice of law theory and 
looked to the place of injury9 to determine whether an injured party might 
directly sue an insurance company. Yet the fundamental problem in such a 
suit is not the actual tort liability of the insurer but rather the mere preliminary 
right of the injured party to bring the action directly.10 Hence the majority of 
courts in deciding whether a direct action can be maintained first decide the 
contract question and look to the place of making11 of the contract of insurance 
before determining the secondary issue of tort liability. However, the use of the 
place of making creates an incentive for insurance companies to issue policies in 
states which are prone to permit no-action clauses to exist although the policy 
itself will cover a risk in a direct action state.12 Hence direct action forums have 
attempted to use theories of place of performance, 13 place of intention of par-
ties, 14 or place of substantial contacts15 in order to circumvent the results reached 
under a doctrine looking to the place of making. Regardless of the appropriate 
conflict of laws rule, a forum may feel that its local law denying the right of 
direct action expresses a substantially strong public policy to override normal con-
£lict of laws principles.16 Until the principal case, it was doubtful whether the 
public policy of a direct action forum could be sufficiently strong to counteract 
provisions of contracts made in other states.17 It has long been held that for a 
state to apply local law to alter an insurance policy made and issued elsewhere 
would result in a deprivation of due process unless substantial contacts were 
7Robbins v. Short, (La. App. 1936) 165 S. 512; Anderson v. State Farm Mutual 
Auto Ins. Co., 222 Minn. 428, 24 N.W. (2d) 836 (1946). 
a McArthur v. Maryland Cas. Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 S. 305 (1939); Wells v. Irwin, 
(D.C. Tex. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 212, affd. sub nom., Wells v. American Employers' Ins. 
Co., (5th Cir. 1943) 132 F. (2d) 316. 
9 Andrews v. Poole, 182 S.C. 206, 188 S.E. 860 (1936); Hildalgo v. Fidelity & Cas. 
Co., (D.C. La. 1952) 104 F. Supp. 230. 
l0lfANcocx:, ToRTs IN CoNFLICT oF LAws 240 (1942). 
11 Riding v. Travelers Ins. Co., 48 R.I. 433, 138 A. 186 (1927); Boisvert v. Boisvert, 
94 N.H. 357, 53 A. (2d) 515 (1947); Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, note 5 supra; Fisher v. 
Home Indemnity Co., (5th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 218. 
12 Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Eunice Rice Milling Co., (5th Cir. 1952) 
198 F. (2d) 613; Mayo v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., (D.C. La. 1952) 
106 F. Supp. 579. 
13 Martin v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., (1st Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 
6; Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, note 5 supra. 
14 Duncan v. Ashwander, (D.C. La. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 829. 
15 See the dissent in Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Eunice Rice Milling Co., 
note 12 supra. 
10 Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W. (2d) 547 (1946). 
17 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 54 
S.Ct. 634 (1934); Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, note 5 supra; Mayo v. Zurich General Accident & 
Liability Ins. Co., note 12 supra. 
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evidenced in the forum.18 It would seem that the principal case is an inroad 
on former decisions. Previously, state insurance legislation has been limited to 
regulatory measures rather than enforcement of contracts contrary to the under-
taking of the parties.19 In the principal case, Louisiana, besides being the place 
of injury and one of the places of performance, had also exacted consent from 
the defendant insurer to do business in the state. As suggested by Justice 
Frankfurter's concurring opinion, it is questionable whether the Court would 
have considered Louisiana's connection sufficient if the insurer, served by some 
means, was not doing business in the state. It is even more speculative if the 
insurer, having no activities in the state but only assets in the form of debts 
owed to it, were proceeded against quasi in rem. Apparently the Court's opinion 
can be interpreted as saying that the interest of a state in protecting its inhabi-
tants from the hardships of the traditional action against the insured is a suffi-
cient motivation to permit such direct action even as against normal conflict of 
laws rules. If the principal case is construed as holding that the forum had 
sufficient contacts with the insurer to ignore normal conflict rules, it similarly 
might be interpreted as a retraction from the Hughes 11. Fetter2° doctrine of 
compelling full faith and credit to the laws of sister states except when the 
policy of the forum is substantially opposed thereto.21 The principal case, by 
holding that a direct action statute is founded upon such a legitimate policy 
interest, indicates the Court's possible inclination to yield to state policy in areas 
outside of the traditional workmen's compensation cases.22 
On the other hand, the law which Louisiana was permitted to reject was 
Illinois and Massachusetts common law. No foreign statute being involved, 
there occurred no abridgment of the normal restriction23 on the extent to which 
a forum may use public policy as an excuse for ignoring foreign law. Hence 
the principal case would indicate that, in proper circumstances, a forum without 
any strong public policy might be compelled by full faith and credit to apply 
foreign case law besides foreign statutory law when settled conflict of laws rules 
1s American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co., 250 U.S. 2, 39 S.Ct. 431 
(1919); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 50 S.Ct. 338 (1930). 
10 Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 60 S.Ct. 758 (1940); Hoopeston Canning Co. v. 
Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 63 S.Ct. 602 (1943). See Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion 
in the principal case, at 78. 
20 341 U.S. 609, 71 S.Ct. 980 (1951). 
21 Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532, 55 S.Ct. 
518 (1935); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493, 
59 S.Ct. 629 (1939). · 
22 See note 21 supra. 
23 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 S.Ct. 589 (1935); Order of United Com-
mercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 67 S.Ct. 1355 (1947); Hughes v. Fetter, note 
20 supra; First National Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396, 72 S.Ct. 421 (1952). 
Though apparently overlooked, it might well have been argued that Louisiana was rejecting 
statutory foreign law in that Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 175, §§112, 113, permitting 
direct actions only after an unsatisfied judgment against the insured, could be deemed to 
be a statutory declaration of foreign law validating the no-action clause of the insurance 
policy. 
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demand it. The principal case, therefore, might be interpreted as an expansion, 
rather than a contraction, of the Hughes doctrine. Such a construction would 
also indicate that conBict of laws problems are increasingly becoming constitu-
tional problems. 
Harvey A. H0111ard, S.Ed. 
